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Abstract
We analyze a nonlinear pricing model with limited information. Each buyer can purchase a large
variety, d, of goods. His preference for each good is represented by a scalar and his preference over d
goods is represented by a d-dimensional vector. The type space of each buyer is given by a compact
subset of Rd+ with a continuum of possible types. By contrast, the seller is limited to o¤er a nite
number M of d-dimensional choices.
We provide necessary conditions that the optimal nite menu of the social welfare maximizing prob-
lem has to satisfy. We establish an underlying connection to the theory of quantization and provide an
estimate of the welfare loss resulting from the usage of the d-dimensional M -class menu. We show that
the welfare loss converges to zero at a rate proportional to d=M2=d.
We show that in higher dimensions, a signicant reduction in the welfare loss arises from an optimal
partition of the d-dimensional type space that takes advantage of the correlation among the d parameters.
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1 Introduction
The primary focus in the theory of mechanism design has been to model and analyze the role of private in-
formation in economic environments. The optimal solution of mechanism design problem typically resolves
trade-o¤ between the socially e¢ cient or revenue-maximizing allocation and the constraints imposed by the
private information of the agents. However, when putting the theory of mechanism design into practice,
other theoretically important and practically important issues come into consideration, in particular the
cost of operating the mechanism. An important, but implicit, assumption in the overwhelming majority
of earlier work is the assumption that the revelation of the information and the implementation of the
associated allocation is realized with zero cost. The emphasis of the present contribution is to analyze a
canonical mechanism design problem when it is costly to reveal or to transmit the private information.
In an earlier work (Bergemann, Shen, Xu, and Yeh (2012)), we analyzed the canonical nonlinear pricing
model in which a seller o¤ers a menu with a nite number of choices to a buyer with a continuum of possible
valuations. Within the linear-quadratic model (following a tradition established by the seminal papers in
this area, e.g. Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984)), we establish a link between the
classic screening model and the theory of quantization. In particular, we bound the loss that we incur
from using discretized contracts, both in terms of the social welfare and the sellers expected revenue. A
key insight, that we shall use in present context as well, is that we can view the private information (i.e.
the individual taste parameter) as the source signal and his choice (quantity or quality available according
to the menu) as the representation level. It then follows that the relationship between type and choice
can be described in terms of the Lloyd-Max optimality conditions, a well-established result in the theory
of quantization. In the welfare maximization problem, where the private information is either publicly
observable or can be elicited by means of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, the central objective is
to determine the socially optimal allocation. It then follows by the above insight that the total social
welfare can be written as the mean square error between the source signal and the representation level.
A similar technique can be applied to the revenue maximization problem by reformulating it as a welfare
maximization problem, using the representation of the objective function by means of the virtual utility.
In both situations, we show that a contract with n choices, an n-class contract, converges to its continuous
counterpart at a rate proportional to 1=n2. It is worth mentioning that this is an exact result rather an
asymptotic one, i.e., the result holds for any n, small or large.
In the present contribution, we apply this approach to a (particular class of) multi-dimensional screening
problems where the consumer is facing a variety of goods and his preference over each good can be charac-
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terized by a scalar (so that his preference over all varieties is summarized by a vector). The one-dimensional
Lloyd-Max conditions can be extended to their multi-dimensional counterparts, as represented vividly by
the celebrated Voronoi diagram. Thus, even in the multi-dimensional environment, we can provide an
upper bound on the convergence rate and show that it is consistent with its one-dimensional case if we
quantize each dimension by a scalar quantizer separately. Given this, each dimension contributes the same
amount and the overall loss is represented by the summation over all d independent scalar quantization.
Yet, we can considerably improve the upper bound by using vector quantization over the entire multi-
dimensional type space. Here we rely on results from the theory of vector quantization and analyze the
advantage of vector quantization over scalar quantization when d becomes su¢ ciently large. The total gain
is shown to consist of three parts: (i) space-lling advantage, (ii) shape advantage and (iii) dependence
advantage. Most notably, even in the extreme case when the types are distributed independently and uni-
formly across all dimensions, the vector quantization method can still reduce the welfare loss signicantly,
due to the space-lling advantage.
In the past decade a number of notable contributions have analyzed nearly-optimal contracts in the
context of communication constraints. In the context of the public good provision, Ledyard and Palfrey
(2002) nd that simple voting rules can perform su¢ ciently close to the fully exact one in the presence of
large populations. In a two-sided matching market, McAfee (2002) and Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Ozdenoren
(2010) compare the performance of coarse matching (binary segmentation of whole population on each
side) versus an exact assortative matching scheme, with or without monetary transfers or information
asymmetry. To determine the optimal rationing of service, Wilson (1989) pioneered this literature by
emphasizing the use of a nite number of priority classes. Importantly, these contributions conne their
analysis to a one-dimensional space of private information. By contrast, we are explicitly focussing on the
role of multi-dimensional private information.
Recently, the e¤ects of limited communication have been investigated in auction environments, another
canonical model in mechanism design. Blumrosen, Nisan, and Segal (2007) analyze limited communication,
in a single-item independent-private-value environment, by assuming that the bidders, each endowed with
a continuously distributed valuation can only use message spaces of nite cardinality. A noteworthy result
is that the welfare optimizing protocols treat the ex ante symmetric agents asymmetrically, and recently
Kos (2011) provided some generalizations. Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) analyze the joint design
of optimal allocation and information structures in a single item auction. They establish that coarse
partitions of the type space and asymmetry in the biddersinformation structure are part of the optimal
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auction design. A number of related papers, including Rothkopf and Harstad (1994), Blumrosen and
Feldman (2006), and Blumrosen, Nisan, and Segal (2007) show that the welfare loss incurred by limited
communication in a single-parameter environment is of the order O(1=n2) where n is the number of choices
available. Our paper, in the framework of nonlinear pricing, achieves a similar bound in the one-dimensional
case and extends the convergence rate to the multi-dimensional case.
We should emphasize that the multi-dimensional screening problem does not represent a trivial exten-
sion of its one-dimensional counterpart. In many environments of interest, the preference of an individual
agent cannot be summarized by a mere scalar but is more suitably represented as a vector. A real-life
example would be a customer who has to make his choices in a supermarket where a large variety of
commodities are available. Hence, designing a smart pricing strategy (e.g., product bundling by o¤ering
a combination of several distinct products for joint sale rather than selling each item separately) is of
rst-order concern in practice. In this respect, Wilson (1993) and Armstrong (1996) are two notable early
contributions with explicit solutions to specic multi-dimensional screening problems. Rochet and Chone
(1998) developed a systematic approach, coined the dual approach, to a general class of environments and
pointed to the prevalence of bunching (agents with di¤erent type prole making the same choices). We
refer readers to Rochet and Stole (2003) for a detailed survey of multi-dimensional screening problems.
Our analysis bypasses the issues related to an exact solution of the multi-dimensional screening problem.
We estimate the welfare loss for any arbitrarily high-dimensional case with continuously distributed types.
Armstrong (1999) is the related to this issue. He established the asymptotic optimality of a single cost-
based two-part tari¤ contract where all consumer surplus can be extracted as the number of varieties goes
to innity. The key assumption for his method is that the tastes are (almost) independently distributed
across multiple products. By contrast, our contribution can accommodate any form of dependence among
valuations of di¤erent products. In fact, the correlation among products implies that it is sub-optimal to
price each commodity separately. The main focus of this paper is then to design and price a nite number
of bundles, composed of a diversity of goods.
2 Model Setup
2.1 Multi-Product Model
We consider a monopolistic rm facing a continuum of consumers and providing d heterogeneous goods.
Each consumers preferences over these goods is characterized by a d-dimensional vector  = (1; : : : ; d) 2
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Rd+, called the consumers type vector, where for 1  l  d, l represents his preference for good l. Let
  Rd+ denote a compact d-dimensional type space. We assume that the joint probability distribution
of , denoted by F (), is commonly known. If a type  consumes the bundle of goods with quantity (or
quality) vector q = (q1; : : : ; qd) by transferring a payment t (q) =
Pd
l=1 tl (ql), where tl (ql) is the payment
for good l with quantity (or quality) ql. Assuming the consumer has linear utility, his net utility is:
u (; q)  t (q) = Tq   t (q)




dd is a d  d matrix which




It turns out that no further assumptions, such as invertibility, symmetry or positive-deniteness of , are
needed for the analysis which follows.
The rm incurs a quadratic cost c (q) = 12q
Tq by providing the bundle q. Here,  = (ij)dd is a
d d symmetric positive-denite matrix which characterizes the interactions in the production of multiple
products. All of its diagonal elements must be positive: ii > 0 for all i. If producing good i raises
(reduces) the marginal cost of producing good j, then we set ij = ji > (<) 0 and call these two goods
substitutes (complements). If ij = ji = 0, the technologies of producing good i and j are independent.
2.2 Multi-Agent Model
An alternative to the multi-product model is a multi-agent model, where the rm serves one product to d
heterogeneous customers with one-dimensional linear utilities. In this case,  can be viewed as the vector
of all customerstastes for the one product. Customer is utility from consuming quantity qi is iiiqi,
and his utility is also a¤ected by othersconsumption. If customer j consumes quantity qj , he imposes
an externality on customer i by raising is utility by ijiqj . If ij > (<) 0, the externality is positive
(negative). If ij = 0, then customer j does not a¤ect is utility. Thus, ij=ii measures the strength of





quanties the total consumerssurplus.
Since the multi-product and the multi-agent model are mathematically equivalent, we will focus on the
multi-product interpretation in this paper.
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3 Welfare Maximization
In the absence of information constraints, M =1, the social welfare is determined by maximizing







This represents a natural extension of the linear-quadratic model to the multi-dimensional case. We say
the social welfare SW (1) has a standard form if  =  = Id (the identity matrix of size d). In fact, we
show that we can always transform the social welfare into the standard form.
We can diagonalize the positive-denite matrix :  = P TP , where  = diag (1; :::; d), i > 0 the
i-th eigenvalue of , and P is a unitary matrix (i.e., P TP = Id). Let B = 1=2P and A =  1=2PT ,






, i = 12 . Then it is easy to show A
TB =  and BTB = . If we introduce
the new type and quantity (or quality) vectors: ̂ = A and q̂ = Bq, then the utility and cost function
can be written in the standard form in terms of ̂; q̂:













Thus, without loss of generality, we focus on the social welfare in the standard form (i.e., assuming that
 =  = Id).
When the consumers type vector is publicly known, it is socially optimal to provide a production vector
equal to the type vector for every consumer: q () = . The maximum social welfare equals:














By contrast, we assume that, due to information constraints, the customer faces a discretized contract,
i.e., a nite number M of pairs f(qm; tm)gMm=1, where qm = (qm;1; : : : ; qm;d) is the m-th quantity (or
quality) vector of goods provided by the seller, tm;l is the price paid for qm;l, and tm =
Pd
l=1 tm;l is the
total price charged for qm. Such a discretized contract or menu is called a d-dimensional M -class contract.
Let fBmgMm=1 represent a partition of the consumers d-dimensional type space , i.e., Bi \ Bj = ;
if i 6= j, and [Mm=1Bm = . A consumer with type vector  2 Bm will choose the quantity (or quality)
vector q () = qm and pay the total price t (q ()) = tm.
In this case, we choose theM -class contract fBm; qmgMm=1 so as to maximize the expected social welfare:
max
fBm;qmgMm=12LF










where the set of all M -class contract for a given distribution F is given by:
LF =
n
fBm; qmgMm=1 : Bi \Bj = ; if i 6= j, and [
M
m=1 Bm = 
o
:
3.1 Connection to Vector Quantization














where kk is the Euclidean norm. In the appendix, we show that if we view  as the input and qm as
the representation point of  in the region Bm, then this becomes the d-dimensional M -region vector
quantization problem, where the partition fBm; gMm=1 and the set of representation points fqmg
M
m=1 are
chosen to minimize the mean square error (MSE):
min
fBm;qmgMm=12LF







In this case, fBm; qmgMm=1 can be viewed as a d-dimensional M -region vector quantizer. Therefore, the
optimal solution must satisfy the following Lloyd-Max conditions for vector quantization, see Gersho and
Gray (1992).
Theorem 1 (Lloyd-Max conditions for vector quantization) Consider the vector quantization problem (3).
The optimal partition fBmg
M
m=1 of the type space and the set of representation points fqmg
M
m=1 must satisfy:
qm = E [j 2 Bm] ; (4)
Bm = f 2 S : k   qmk  k   ql k for all lg : (5)





m=1 is chosen as a Voronoi partition (see Denition 5) with respect to fqmg
M
m=1.
We now consider how the optimal d-dimensional M -class contract can approximate the performance of
the optimal continuous contract for a general joint distribution function F . Specically, we quantify the
welfare loss in terms of the distribution function F , the number of classes M , and the dimension d.
Denition 1 For any joint distribution function F , the welfare loss induced by the optimal d-dimensional
M -class contract compared with the optimal continuous contract is dened by:
(F ;M ; d)  SW  (1)  SW  (M) = inf
fBm;qmgMm=12LF
[SW  (1)  SW (M)] :
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We are interested in the worst-case behavior of the welfare loss over all joint distributions over a d-
dimensional support set with positive and nite volume. Without loss of generality, we may assume the
type space   [0; 1]d.1 Let F be the set of all joint distribution functions in type space   [0; 1]d. Our
main task is to quantify the worst-case behavior of (F ;M ; d) over all distributions F 2 F .
Denition 2 The maximum welfare loss induced by the optimal d-dimensional M -class contract over all
F 2 F is dened by:
(M ; d)  sup
F2F
(F ;M ; d)
3.2 Welfare Loss of One-Dimensional M-Class Contract
Before delving into higher dimensions, we review some basic results of the one-dimensional case as a
reference for comparison. More detailed discussion, together with rigorous proofs, can be found in our
earlier work, Bergemann, Shen, Xu, and Yeh (2012). Note that when d = 1, qm is a scalar and Bm =

















That is, qm is the conditional mean in the interval Bm, and 

m, which separates two neighboring intervals
Bm and Bm+1, is the arithmetic average of qm and q

m+1. In Bergemann, Shen, Xu, and Yeh (2012) we
show that the convergence rate of the welfare loss induced by the optimal one-dimensionalM -class contract
is of order 1=M2. Specically,
(F ;M ; 1)  1
8M2
for all F dened on [0; 1], and M  1. The maximum welfare loss (M ; 1) is upper bounded by 1
8M2
, and
lower bounded by 1
24M2
.
Wilson (1989) arrived at a related result by using a di¤erent technique. He implicitly quantized the
distribution function of  uniformly, and then expanded the social welfare by the Taylor series around zero








in the type space with q0m consistent with the Lloyd-Max conditions and
1For any set   Rd+ with positive and nite volume, let b = sup2S kk. Then 0 < b <1. We normalize all type vectors
in  by the factor b so that   [0; 1]d.
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0m being equally distributed. We use such a quantizer to provide an upper bound on the welfare loss.
Our quantization approach is straightforward, and has the signicant advantage that it extends naturally,
via vector quantization, to the multi-dimensional case. In the following sections, we established that our
earlier results in one dimension can be viewed as special case of a general quantization approach in higher
dimensions.
3.3 Welfare Loss of d-Dimensional M-Class Contract
In this section, we provide our main results on how the d-dimensional M -class contract can approximate
the performance of the optimal continuous contract for a general joint distribution on the type space. We
estimate the convergence rate of the welfare loss induced by discretized contracts as the number of classes
tends to innity.
For any F 2 F , we have





















SW  (1)  SW (M) = 1
2
MSE (M) ; (6)
where









k   qmk2 dF () :
Therefore, we have
(F ;M ; d) = inf
fBm;qmgMm=12LF









k   qmk2 dF () ; (7)
and correspondingly:










k   qmk2 dF () : (8)
Proposition 1 For any F 2 F , and any M  1, d  1, (F ;M ; d)  d
2M2=d
.
Proof. We can construct a vector quantizer with Kd representation points by using the same scalar
quantizer with K representation points in each of the d dimensions. It is easy to see that in this case, we
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simply choose the set of regions as orthotopes, dened as the Cartesian product of intervals in d dimensions.
Such a vector quantizer is called the d-dimensional repeated scalar quantizer. We will use it to prove the




. For any given F 2 F , consider the K-level scalar quantizer fAk; rkgKk=1











rk = EX [XjX 2 Ak] ;
where fAkgKk=1 forms the uniform grid on [0; 1], and rk is the conditional mean on Ak. Construct the
corresponding repeated scalar quantizer fB0m; q0mg
Kd









= f(rk1 ; : : : ; rkd) : kl 2 f1; : : : ;Kg ; l = 1; : : : ; dg :




m =  = [0; 1]
d, and thus fB0m; q0mg
Kd
m=1 2 LF . Since M  Kd,
and since (;M ; ) is a decreasing function of M according to Denition 1,





















































































9=; dFl (l) ;
where
A kl = Ak1  : : :Akl 1 Akl+1 : : :Akd ;
 l = (1; : : : ; l 1; l+1; : : : ; d) ;
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dF l ( ljl) = 1;














2 dFl (l) :
Therefore,



















and rkl = El [ljl 2 Akl ], based on the previous analysis for one-dimensional case
(see Proposition 2 in Bergemann, Shen, Xu, and Yeh (2012)),







































 1, and 2K  K + 1 M1=d.
In order to obtain the convergence rate for the maximum welfare loss, we establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose the elements of the type vector, 1; : : : ; d are i.i.d. uniform random variables, i.e.,
F (1; : : : ; d) =
dQ
l=1





su¢ ciently large, then (F ;M ; d)  18e
d
M2=d
for any d  1.
We will prove this lemma using the analysis in Section 3:4. Proposition 1 provides a general upper
bound on the convergence rate for any joint distribution F 2 F , and Lemma 1 provides a lower bound
on the convergence rate for the i.i.d. uniform distribution, which can also be viewed as a lower bound on
(M ; d). Hence, we have the following result.




is su¢ ciently large, then 18e
d
M2=d
 (M ; d)  12
d
M2=d
for any d  1.
Hence, the maximal welfare loss induced by the d-dimensional M -class contract converges to zero at a




We use the scalar quantization repeatedly to obtain the upper bound of the convergence rate for general
distributions in Proposition 1. However, in repeated scalar quantization, we simply partition the space
with hyperrectangles, orthotopes, and treat each dimension independently, leading to a possibly weak
bound. A natural question arises as to whether we can reduce the convergence rate if we use the optimal
vector quantization. In fact, in higher dimensions (d > 1), a signicant reduction of the welfare loss can
be obtained by using more subtle vector quantization methods which allows us to minimize the loss in a
manner that is impossible in a single dimension. For instance, we can choose quantization regions other
than orthotopes, and we can take advantage of the dependence among the di¤erent entries of the type
vector. This reduction in the welfare loss represents the advantage of vector quantization advantage and
is the main reason why we bundle the consumers preferences over d goods across the d-dimensional type
vector, instead of viewing them separately as d (one-dimensional) types.
3.4 Advantages of Vector Quantization
To simplify our analysis, we assume in this section that the elements of the type vector, 1; : : : ; d, are
identically, but not necessarily independently distributed. Let F and f denote the joint distribution and
joint density respectively, and let F̂ and f̂ denote the marginal distribution and marginal density.
We consider two distinct scenarios. In the rst scenario, we ignore the dependence among the con-
sumers preferences over d goods as if they were d independent scalar (one-dimensional) types 1; : : : ; d.
Since in this section, 1; : : : ; d are assumed to be identically distributed according to the marginal dis-
tribution function F̂ , the seller will o¤er d optimal one-dimensional K-class contracts which are identical




. In this case, the welfare
maximization problem can be viewed as a scalar quantization problem. In the second scenario, we view
the consumers preferences over d goods as a d-dimensional type vector  = (1; : : : ; d). In this case, the
seller o¤ers a d-dimensional Kd-class contract for the type vector  with the joint distribution function




over d dimensions, or equivalently, the




. Recall in this case, the welfare maximization problem can be viewed
as a vector quantization problem. To determine the vector quantization advantage, we can compare the
average welfare loss induced by the optimal d-dimensional Kd-class contract with the welfare loss induced
by the one-dimensional K-class contract.
Denition 3 For any given joint distribution F and its marginal F̂ , the vector quantization advantage for
the social welfare GSW in d dimensions is dened as the ratio of the welfare loss induced by the optimal K-
12











From the above denitions, we can see the larger GSW is, the more we gain from using vector quanti-
zation. For su¢ ciently large K, Lookabaugh and Gray (1989) decompose the gain into three categories as
follows.
Theorem 2 Lookabaugh and Gray (1989) If the number of regions per dimension K becomes su¢ ciently
large, then the quantization advantage for the social welfare can be decomposed into three factors:






f̂ ; f; d





 1, and DP

f̂ ; f; d

 1 are called the space-lling advantage, shape
advantage and dependence advantage, given by (11), (15) and (16), respectively.
Space-lling Advantage As mentioned before, we have the freedom to select more complex region
shapes besides orthotopes in higher dimensions (d > 1). This leads to the space-lling advantage SF (d).
Unlike the shape and dependence advantages, the space-lling advantage is a function only of the dimension,
and provides the same gain for all distributions with the same dimension. To better understand this
advantage, we rst introduce the following concepts.
Denition 4 A convex polytope H is said to be a space partition polytope if Rd can be partitioned by using
the translated and rotated copies of H.
Denition 5 A Voronoi partition with respect to a set of points X = fx1; x2; : : :g is a partition whose
regions are nearest-neighbor regions with respect to X, i.e., a point x is in the region belonging to xi if
kx  xik  kx  xjk for all j, where kk is the Euclidean norm.
Denition 6 The geometric centroid of a convex polytope H is dened as





Denition 7 An admissible polytope is a space partition polytope that can generate a Voronoi partition of
Rd with respect to the set of geometric centroids of the regions in the Voronoi partition.
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Denition 8 The normalized inertia of a polytope H is dened as
I (H) =
R
H kx  ~x (H)k
2 dx
[V (H)]1+2=d
where ~x is the geometric centroid of H, and V (H) is its d-dimensional volume.

















where Hd is the set of all admissible polytopes in Rd.
Denition 10 The optimal admissible polytope is an admissible polytope which has the minimum inertia
of all admissible polytopes, i.e., attains the coe¢ cient of the optimal vector quantization.






12 C (d) : (11)
Example 1 (1) For d = 1, the optimal admissible polytope is trivially the interval, so it is easy to calculate
C (1) = 112 , and the space-lling advantage SF (1) = 1. Thus, there is no space-lling advantage for one
dimensional space, where we can use only scalar quantization.
(2) For d = 2, we can show the equilateral triangle, the rectangle, and the regular hexagon are all
admissible polytopes. Furthermore, the inmum in (10) is achieved when the regular hexagon is used,




, and the space-lling advantage SF (2) = 3
p
3
5  1:0392 Gersho (1979). In other
words, in a two-dimensional space, even if we consider only the space-lling advantage, the welfare loss can
be reduced by 1  1:0392 1  3:77% by choosing the partition based on a set of regular hexagons, instead of
a partition based on rectangles, as in the repeated scalar quantization.
To see intuitively why hexagons are better than rectangles in two dimensions, consider the i.i.d. uniform
distribution. Suppose we use the same number of hexagons or rectangles to partition the space, each of
which has the same area. Note that when the distances between points on the boundary of a region to its
centroid are more equalized, as in the hexagon, the MSE in two dimensions becomes lower. This is because
the MSE is a convex function of the distance between the boundary points and the centroid.
For d  3, it is quite hard to nd the optimal admissible polytope. However, it is a classic result that the
d-dimensional sphere has smaller normalized inertia than any d-dimensional convex polytope. Therefore,
14
if the sphere were an admissible polytope, the inmum in (10) would be achieved. Unfortunately, spheres
cannot be used to cover the space. However, a lower bound on C (d), or equivalently an upper bound on
SF (d) can be obtained by using the sphere Gersho (1979):





where Vd is the volume of a unit sphere in d-dimensional Euclidean space.
Zador (1982) developed an upper bound on C (d), or equivalently a lower bound on SF (d) using random
quantization where the representation points are picked at random, and the partition is a Voronoi partition
with respect to the set of representation points:
SF (d)  SFL (d) =
d
12  (1 + 2=d)
(Vd)
2=d : (13)
Conway and Sloane (1985) further showed that




for all d  1, and
lim
d!1
SFL (d) = lim
d!1






The above result indicates that we can choose admissible polytopes which are closer geometrically to
the sphere as the dimension d becomes larger, and the optimal admissible polytope indeed approaches the
sphere in innite dimensional space, with the space-lling advantage SF (d) asymptotically approaching
e
6  1:423.
From (11), we can see that the space-lling advantage depends only on the coe¢ cient of vector quan-
tization, and hence by (10), only on the e¢ ciency with which admissible polytopes can ll the space.
Specically, it does not depend on the probability distribution of the type or the dependence among the
elements of the type vector.
Although the set of optimal admissible polytopes and their centroids determine the space-lling ad-
vantage, they do not generate the optimal vector quantizer in general. Recall that the optimal quantizer
must satisfy the Lloyd-Max conditions and are a¤ected by the distribution of the type and the dependence
among the elements of the type. These e¤ects are captured by the shape and dependence advantages.
For the i.i.d. uniform distribution, however, optimal admissible polytopes and their centroids do form the
optimal vector quantizer because the entire gain of vector quantization is captured by the space-lling
advantage.
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depends solely on the shape of the marginal density function f̂ and
does not depend on how the random vector  is scaled (see the following example of the Gaussian density).




 1 for all f̂ and d  1. We consider two examples.





for all d  1. In other words, the vector quantizer cannot provide any shape advantage for the uniform
distribution.
















2 which is independent of the variance 2 Lookabaugh and


































(f (1; : : : ; d))
d=d+2 d1 : : : dd
i(d+2)=d : (16)
Given the dimension, DP

f̂ ; f; d

depends on the joint density function and its marginal density
function, and thus implicitly on the dependence among 1; : : : ; d. It is easy to show DP

f̂ ; f; d

= 1 if
1; : : : ; d are i.i.d. random variables, i.e.,




In this case, the gain over the scalar quantizer is entirely attributed to the space-lling and shape ad-
vantages. In other cases, however, it may be quite di¢ cult to calculate it analytically, since the joint
density function and the calculation of d-dimensional integral are required. Nevertheless, we can still
obtain some intuition how vector quantization takes advantage of the probabilistic dependence from the
following example.
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f () = 0 otherwise. This indicates 1 and 2 are positively correlated, representing the consumers types
for two complement commodities. We can show that both 1 and 2 are marginally uniformly distributed
on [0; 1] with the correlation coe¢ cient  = 1  1
n2
. We can calculate DP

f̂ ; f; 2

= n = 1p
1  . Note that
DP

f̂ ; f; 2

= 1 when 1 and 2 are uncorrelated, i.e.,  = 0 (or n = 1). The more correlated 1 and 2
are, i.e., the larger  (or n) is, the larger DP

f̂ ; f; 2

becomes. It becomes arbitrarily large as 1 and 2
become complete positive correlated, i.e., ! 1 (or n!1).
[width=3in]g-dep
Figure 1: An example of the Dependence Advantage
Now we compare the two-dimensional vector quantization with the scalar quantization for the above
example. Since the marginal density is uniform, we do not have any shape advantage with vector quanti-
zation. Suppose we were only allowed to use rectangles to partition the space so that we would not have
the space-lling advantage either. In this case, the above example says we can still reduce the MSE (or








(with the positive density) with vector quantization, instead of partitioning the whole
space [0; 1]2 with repeated scalar quantization. Thus, the reduction results from exploiting the dependence
between 1 and 2 by vector quantization.
Based on the above analysis, we now prove Lemma 1.




. Recall that there are no shape and dependence advantages for






f̂ ; f; d

= 1. When K̂ is su¢ ciently
large,






f̂ ; f; d
















, as established in Bergemann, Shen, Xu, and Yeh
(2012), so we have
(F ;M ; d)  




















2  18e dM2=d ,
which concludes the proof.
17
In summary, vector quantization can take advantage of dimensionality, the shape of the marginal
density, and the dependence among di¤erent elements of the type vector, whereas this is impossible with
scalar quantization. Even for the i.i.d. uniform distribution for which there are no shape and dependence
advantages, vector quantization can still o¤er the space-lling advantage approaching to e6  1:423. That
is, vector quantization can reduce the welfare loss by roughly 1  6e  29:7% as the dimension d and the
number of regions per dimension K become su¢ ciently large. Even though vector quantization might not
improve the convergence rate of the welfare loss, it improves the coe¢ cient signicantly. This means that
vector quantization can provide lower welfare losses per dimension compared with the scalar quantization.
4 Conclusions
Based on the information-theoretic approach developed in Bergemann, Shen, Xu, and Yeh (2012) in a
one-dimensional environment, we analyzed the welfare maximizing problem in a multi-product environ-
ment. We o¤ered two approaches to estimate a bound on the welfare loss. The rst approach dealt with
each dimension separately and then applied scalar quantization to each dimension, similar to the one-
dimensional analysis. Such treatment ignores the dependence among the prole of all types. The second
approach explicitly used vector quantization to introduce an additional advantage which in turn improved
the coe¢ cient of the convergence rate of the welfare loss. This improvement becomes signicant when the
number of choices along each dimension becomes large. Our analysis has illustrated that a simple contract
with few choices can achieve a signicantly high level of welfare.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide a brief and self-contained introduction to the theory of quantization. We can
view scalar (one-dimensional) quantization as a process of approximating a continuous random variable
(called the input) X on  = [a; b]  R by a nite set of discrete values Y  fykgnk=1  R. In other words,
we can dene an n-level scalar (one-dimensional) quantizer as fA; Y g = fAk; ykgnk=1, where
(i) A is a partition of the input set  = [a; b] into n intervals: A  fAkgnk=1, where Ak = [xk 1; xk),
and fxkgnk=1 are often called the boundary points or endpoints which form an increasing sequence with
x0 = a, and xn = b;
(ii) Y is a set of representation points: Y = fykgnk=1  R.






where the indicator function 1Ak (x) = 1 if x 2 Ak and 0 otherwise.
The quality of a quantizer is usually measured by the squared error e (x; y) = jx  yj2. If the random
variableX is drawn from a probability distribution function F (x), then the n-level scalar (one-dimensional)
quantization problem can be viewed as choosing the partition A = fAkgnk=1 and the set of representation
points Y = fykgnk=1 to minimize the Mean Squared Error (MSE):
min
A;Y
MSE (n) = min
fAi;yigni=1






(x  yk) dF (x)
Now the question is how to determine the partition fAkgnk=1 and the representation points fykg
n
k=1
and to minimize the mean squared error. In 1957, however, Lloyd proposed optimality conditions (called
Lloyd-Max conditions) that any optimal quantizer (one with the smallest MSE) must satisfy, which can
be stated in the following way: (1) given the representation points Y = fykgnk=1, the boundary point xk is
chosen to be the midpoint between the two representation points yk and yk+1, i.e., xk = 12 (yk + yk+1); (2)
given the partition A = fAkgnk=1, the representation point yk corresponding to a given interval Ak must
be the conditional mean of X on that interval, i.e., yk = EX [XjX 2 Ak].
Similarly, we can view d-dimensional vector quantization as a process of approximating a d-dimensional
continuous random vector (called the input)X on   Rd by a nite set of discrete values Y  fymgMm=1 
Rd. In other words, we can dene an d-dimensional M -region vector quantizer as fB; Y g = fBm;ymgMm=1,
where
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(i) B is a partition of the input set  into M regions: B  fBmgMm=1, where Bi \ Bj = ; if i 6= j, and
[Mm=1Bm = ;
(ii) Y is a set of representation points: Y = fymgMm=1  Rd.
In this manner, the vector quantizer can be viewed as a mapping y :  ! Y , so that y (x) = ym if





where the indicator function 1Bm (x) = 1 if x 2 Bm and 0 otherwise.
The quality of a quantizer can be usually measured by the squared error e (x;y) = kx  yk2 =
(x  y)T (x  y), where kk is the Euclidean norm. If the random vector X is drawn from a joint prob-
ability distribution function F (x), then the d-dimensional M -region vector quantization problem can be
viewed as choosing the partition B = fBmgMm=1 and the set of representation points Y = fymg
M
m=1 to
minimize the Mean Squared Error (MSE):
min
B;Y
MSE (M) = min
fBm;ymgMm=1






(x  yk) dF (x)
The Lloyd-Max conditions that any optimal vector quantizer must satisfy can be stated in the following
way: (1) given the representation points fymgMm=1, the partition B = fBmg
M
m=1 is chosen to be the Voronoi
partition with respect to fymgMm=1, i.e., Bm = fX 2  : kX   ymk  kX   ylk for all lg; (2) given the
partition B = fBmgMm=1, the representation points ym corresponding to a given region Bm must be the
conditional mean of X on that region, i.e., ym = EX [XjX 2 Bm].
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